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of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MEREDITH PAGE and MAURINE S. PAGE, ) 




FEDERAL SECURITY INSURANCE COMPANY ) 
a Utah corporation, ' 





PETITION FOR REHEARING 
-----------
Comes now the above named defendant-appeH 
and petitions this Honorable Court for rehearing 
the above entitled cause, and for an order vacati1 
the denial of the appeal and affirmance of the 
judgment of the trial court. 
This pet it ion is based upon the points eet 
forth in the defendant-appellant's brief lierein. 
We do hereby certify that in our opinion tl 
is good cause to believe that the judgment obje~t~ 
is erroneous and that the case should be reexWDI 
as prayed in said petition. 
Dated January 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
MEREDITH PAGE and MAURINE S. 
PAGE, Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
FEDERAL SECURITY INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
8815 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING 
CARDINAL POINTS TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE 
COURT IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR 
REHEARING IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED CAUSE 
OF ACTION. 
The defendant and appellant respectfully submits to this 
Honorable Court its contentions as to why the petition for 
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rehearing should be granted and the matter resubmitted for 
further consideration. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Point One. The Court erred in its decision wherein it 
stated that, according to her testimony, the widow of the de-
ceased insured should have had the policy in her possession. 
Point Two. The Court erred in its decision wherein it 
is stated that the defendant company claimed to have notified 
the reinsurer, Lincoln National Life Insurance Company, of 
the conversion of the policy to a paid-up policy. 
Point Three. The Defendant-Appellant based its chal-
lenge to the jury's verdict not only on the testimony of the 
witnesses, but also on the written documentary evidence which 
was uncontradicted and certainly credible evidence, and which 
the jury arbitrarily disregarded. 
Point Four. The entire records of the defendant company, 
together with the corroborating testimony of the witnesses, 
established that as a matter of law the deceased insured had 
elected one of the options under the policy. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS DECISION WHEREIN 
IT STATED THAT, ACCORDING TO HER TESTIMONY, 
THE WIDOW OF THE DECEASED INSURED SHOULD 
HAVE HAD THE POLICY IN HER POSSESSION. 
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In the Court's opinion, it is stated: 
"It is also significant that, according to her testimony, 
she received the policy in the mail after these talks, and 
therefore would have had it in her possession. Yet 
after her husband's death she * * * did not have the 
policy, nor did she have either the rider or the accom-
panying letter, which the company claimed were sent." 
The testimony shows that the decedent's widow, Ruth 
Jensen Page, did not claim to have had the policy in her pos-
session at any time, except briefly when it was first returned 
by the insurance company. 
"Q. (Mr. Cotro-Manes) Now, after the policy came 
back from the Insurance Company like you said 
you wanted, what did you do with the life insur-
ance policy ? 
A. (Ruth Jensen Page) My husband had it. 
Q. What did he do with it? 
A. Do with it? 
Q. Where did he put it? 
A. I don't know whether we had it or his dad had it. 
We used to keep it in the safety box." 
Recotrd, 27-28 
"Q. (Mr. Cotro-Manes )Then, the next time you saw 
this policy was after your husband's death, on the 
22nd day of April, 1957, is that correct, when they 
showed it to you, when Mr. Rannow showed it to 
you? 
A. (Mrs. Page) Yes." 
Record, 28 
The testimony of Meredith Page, one of the plaintiffs 
herein, was to the effect that the policy was in his safe at his 
home on the date of the death of the insured. (Record 95). 
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In the light of the testimony of Ruth Jensen Page and 
Meredith Page, we submit that there is no basis for the Court's 
contention that, according to her testimony, the widow should 
have had the policy in her possession when her husband died. 
We further submit that in the light of the testimony, there 
is but one conclusion to be reached, that is to say, that the letter 
of transmittal and the rider would be with the policy, and it is 
undisputed that this policy was, at the time of the insured's 
death, in the possession of the plaintiff, Meredith' Page. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS DECISION WHEREIN IT 
IS STATED THAT THE DEFENDANT COMPANY 
CLAIMED TO HAVE NOTIFIED THE REINSURER, LIN-
COLN NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, OF 
THE CONVERSION OF THE POLICY TO A PAID-UP 
POLICY. 
The record shows that the defendant insurance company, 
throughout the entire trial, contended that the Lincoln National 
Life Insurance Company was not notified of the conversion 
of the policy in question to a paid-up policy, on the ground 
and for the reason that such information was not required to be 
sent and was not, in fact, sent to the Lincoln National Life. 
"Q. (Mr. Ronnow) Did you at any time after this 
alleged election advise Lincoln National that the 
policy has been changed from a current policy to 
one of paid-up in the sum of $1443.00? 
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A. (Erich Olschewski) We advised termination. 
Q. You advised termination, is that correct? Did you 
advise them as to the election of one of these 
clauses? 
A. No, we did not explain then." 
Record, 64 
"Q. (Mr. Ronnow) * * *You asked Lincoln National 
to terminate their insurance on this policy? 
A. (Mr. Olschewski) Yes. 
Q. Did you write them a letter? 
A. No. That is done by the clerk who handled it once 
a month with other cases that might be terminated." 
Record, 64 
"Q. (Mr. Ronnow) I show you what has been marked 
as Exhibit 6, and will you tell us what type of 
statement it is? 
A. (Mr. Olschewski) This is the notice to the rein-
surance company advising them of discontinuance 
of the premium payment for reinsurance payment 
and to request a refund if any refund is due on any 
unearned payment in the case of Alma M. Page. 
Q. If Mr. Page did not pay any premium after the 
middle of 1955, his policy would be listed on such 
a report, would it not? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And his policy would be listed there irregardless 
of whether he had elected any of these options or 
failed to pay his premium and made no election? 
A. No." 
Record, 65, 66 
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The record discloses in detail the extensive procedure 
involved in the notification of the Lincoln National, the re-
insureL Nowhere in the record do any of the defendant's 
witnesses state that they notified Lincoln National of any 
election of any of the options covered by the policy. 
What was actually done, was that on September 16, 1955, 
the Lincoln National was notified that the Alma Page policy 
was "lapsed" as fat as Lincoln National Life was concerned. 
It must be borne in mind, and the record so shows, that the 
reinsurance policy with Lincoln National had been paid for 
one year in advance, that is to say, from the 15th day of 
December, 1954, to December 15, 1955, as had the premium 
to the defendant company. 
Therefore, the defendant had notified the Lincoln Na-
tional of a premium rebate dating from July 15, 1955 to 
Pecember 15, 1955. The explanation of the dating back to 
July 15 was stated by Mr. Olschewski as shown at Record 71, 
wherein it was pointed out that the 31-day grace period was 
taken into consideration in dating back the "lapsed" date, as 
far as· the Lincoln National was concerned, from the date of 
the election by Alma Page in August, to July. 
This statement is substantiated by plaintiff's Exhibit 13 
(telegram from Lincoln National). 
The date of September 16 was merely the date when 
request was made for rebate from Lincoln. 
It should be remembered that the policy in question was 
paid up .until December 15, 1955, and the defendant company 
could not have treated the policy as lapsed if it were not for 
the fact that an election had been made by the insured. 
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POINT THREE 
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT BASED ITS CHAL-
LENGE TO THE JURY'S VERDICT NOT ONLY ON THE 
TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES, BUT ALSO ON THE 
WRITTEN DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WHICH WAS 
UNCONTRADICTED AND CERTAINLY CREDIBLE EVI-
DENCE, AND WHICH THE JURY ARBITRARILY DIS-
REGARDED. 
Defendant's Exhibit 10, a letter dated August 3, 1955, 
from the defendant to the insured and his wife, contains the 
following paragraph relating to the insurance policy: 
"We shall continue to hold your policy in our pos-
session until we hear from you.'' 
Exhibit 10 was in the possession of the decedent's widow, 
Ruth Jensen Page. The plaintiffs did not attempt to contradict 
this letter nor in any way contradict the testimony of Mrs. 
Page that she and her husband received that letter. This 
documentary evidence establishes beyond any doubt that the 
company had the insurance policy in its possession on the 3rd 
day of August, 1955. 
Can the jury arbitrarily disregard this evidence? 
Defendant's Exhibit 12 is a carbon copy of a letter of 
transmittal from the defendant to the insured, which shows 
the return of the insurance policy to the insured. This exhibit 
was attacked by plaintiffs, not on the ground that it was 
fraudulent or that it was prepared at some time other than 
that testified to by the defendant's witnesses, but on the 
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The uncontradicted testimony of Merle Thomas Olschew-
ski shows that the letter was dictated to her by Mr. Olschewski, 
that she took it down by shorthand, transcribed it from her 
notes, typed the letter, addressed the envelope, placed the 
letter in the envelope, stamped it and mailed it to Mr. Alma 
Page at Riverton, Utah. (R. 84 through 87). 
"The mailing of a letter postpaid, and properly ad-
dressed to a person shown to reside in a city or town 
to which the letter was addressed, creates no legal pre-
sumption, but a presumption or inference of fact, that 
it reached its destination." 
Campbell v. Gowans et al 
35 U. 268, 100 P. 397 
''A writing or document made contemporaneously 
with a transaction in which are evidenced facts perti-
nent to an issue, when admitted as proof of those facts, 
is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of 
greater probative force than the oral testimony of a 
witness as to such facts based upon memory and recol-
lection." 
20 Am. Jur. 1029 
Evidence, Sec. 1179 
It is to be observed that the oral testimony did not con-
flict with the written documentary evidence, but clearly 
paralleled the writing in every respect. There being no con-
tradictory testimony, this evidence stands as uncontradicted 
evidence, and to allow a jury to pass upon such evidence which 
stands· unimpeached and uncontradicted by any means, is, we 
submit, to allow the jury to resort to speculation, conjecture, 
surmise, guess and supposition. 
The uncontradicted documentary evidence cannot be said 
to stand in the same position as the testimony of an interested 
10 
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witness, which the court alleges Ruth Jensen Page (the widow) 
to be. We submit that where a witness who might have some 
interest testifies to facts which are borne out by uncontradicted 
documentary evidence, such facts stand as established, and a 
jury should not be allowed to speculate. 
The court points out that the widow was a recent immi-
grant to the United States, who admitted that she experienced 
some difficulty in understanding insurance matters. Certainly, 
it cannot be doubted that she knew that she and her husband 
went to the company's office to make an election. We submit 
that it was not proper to permit the jury to decide this fact, 
as there was no evidence at all to the effect that the insured 
and the witness. did not go to the company offices, but on 
the contrary, there are three witnesses and two documents 
to establish the fact. It cannot be doubted that the various 
options contained in the policy were discussed, and this evi-
dence, being uncontradicted, should not have been left to 
speculation on the part of the jury. 
For a woman who did not understand insurance, the 
widow gave a definition of "paid-up insurance" which would 
put many natives to shame. 
"Q. (.Mr. Bushnell) Mrs. Page, will you state what 
you understand to be meant by the term paid-up 
insurance? 
A. Amount that would be left over when we stopped 
payments, and we owed on the insurance, I under-
stand, $400. for payment and then we deduct that 
from it and then that paid-up insurance is all that 
would be on the insurance if anything happened." 
R. 29, 30 
11 
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Mrs. Page was asked one question on re-direct examination 
as follows: 
"Q. (Mr. Cotro-Manes) Mrs. Page, do you remember 
the amount of insurance on the paid-up insurance 
policy? 
A. One thousand four hundred something." 
R. 32 
In the light of this evidence and all other uncontradicted 
evidence introduced in the case, this matter should not have 
been submitted to a jury and the jury permitted to speculate, 
in view of the decisions regarding speculation by juries, which 
this jurisdiction recognizes and purports to follow: 
"The general rule that the credibility of witnesses 
is a question for a jury alone does not mean that the 
jury is at liberty, under the guise of passing upon the 
credibility of a witness, to disregard his testimony when 
from no reasonable point of view it is open to doubt.·· 
Chesapeake & 0. R. Co. vs. Martin, 1931, 
283 U. S. 209, 75 L. Ed. 983 
51 S. Ct. 45 3, 62 A.L.R. 2d 1192, 1201 
The Supreme Court of Wyoming, in the case of Beck 
vs. Givens, 1957, ____ Wyoming ____ , 309 P.2d 715, 313 P.2d 
977, held that while the trier of facts should be accorded great 
freedom in evaluating testimony it should not arbitrarily dis-
regard the undisputed testimony of a witness in the absence 
of evasiveness, equivocation, improbability or impossibility. 
In the annotation in 62 A.L.R. 2d 1192, many cases are 
cited in support of the proposition that juries may not arbi-
trarily disregard testimony which is not contradicted nor in 
any way discredited. 
12 
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"But when the testimony of witnesses, interested 
in the event or otherwise, is clear and convincing, not 
incredible in the light of general knowledge ~nd 
common experience, not extraordinary, not contradict-
ed in any way by witnesses or circumstances, and so 
plain and complete that disbelief of the story could 
not reasonably arise in the rational process of an ordi-
narily intelligent mind, then a question has c been pre-
sented for the· court- to decide and not the jury." 
(Citing cases.) 
Ferdinand v. Agricultural Ins. Co. 
22 N. ]. 482, 126 A2d 3231 .62 A.L.R. 
2d 1179, 1187 
"Where the positive testimony of a witness is un-
contradicted and unimpeached, either by other positive 
testimony or by circumstantial evidence, either ex-
trinsic or intrinsic, it cannot be disregarded, but must 
control the decision of the court or ·jury." 
62 A.L.R. 2d 1197, citing 
Anderson, v. Liljengren 
50 Minn. 3, 52 N.W. 219 
·' ;, 
We submit that the only contradiction in the whole 
record, as we view it, is that Mr. Page, one of the plaintiffs 
herein, testified that the policy had been in his strong box ever 
since it was issued. 
"Q. (Mr. Cotro~Manes) All right, you stated a minute 
ago that you have a strong box at yot;1r. home, 1s 
that correct? 
A. Yes.· 
Q. And that the policy had been inside that box ever 
since it was issued? 
A. That is right. 
13 
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Q. And your son never had the combination to it? 
A. That is right. 
Q. All this time the policy was in this box? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ever give it to your son? 
A. I have never given it to my son." 
R. 102 
All the documentary evidence and the testimony of all 
of the defendant's witnesses show that the policy in question 
was delivered to the defendant insurance company, and that 
the defendant, on August 3, 1955, advised the insured and 
his wife: 
"We shall continue to hold your policy in our pos-
session until we hear from you." 
Defendant's Exhibit 10 
Further, the defendant, in its communication to the 
insured, dated August 15, 1955, stated: 
" ... we return herewith your policy No. 20 PLB-
3101." 
Defendant's Exhibit 12 
The court, in its decision, states, inter alia: 
"Meredith Page further testified that after Alma's 
death he telephoned the defendant's office and the 
person answering for the company, upon being advised 
of Alma's death, took several minutes to check into the 
matter and told him that according to their records 
he and his wife as beneficiaries, were entitled to the 
full face amount, of the policy, minus a $400.00 loan." 
The record shows, with regard to this telephone call: 
14 
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"Q. (Mr. Bushnell) Take your time, Mr. Page. After 
you identified the policy and told her why you were 
calling, was there any discussion concerning forms 
or items on the policy or things of that kind ? 
* * * * 
A. She said that the forms would be mailed out for 
the death claim of the policy, and then I said how 
much would be the amount and she said it was less 
the $400.00 * * * ." 
R. 97. 
At the time this phone call was made, Mr. Page, the 
witness, haq before him the insurance policy showing on its 
face the amount of $11,682.00, unless the rider showing the 
election was attached. In all sincerity, we ask: Why, when 
he had the policy before' him, was it necessa!y foi Mr. Page 
to telephone the company and ask a clerk, "How much would 
be the amount"? Is is not logical to conclude that the rider 
was attached to the policy, as testified by the other witnesses, 
and that Mr. Page, having doubts, 'called the , defendant's 
office to ascertain vyhat it meant? 
Further, it was his own counsel who put the amount in 
Mr. Page's mouth, when he asked: 
"Q. (Mr. Bushnell) When you say the amount here 
are you talking about the fac,e amount of $11,682 ?" 
R. 97, 98 
Nowhere in the whole record does it show that anyone 
ever actually told Mr. Page that he was entitled to $11,682.00 
less the loan. 
15 
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POINT FOUR 
THE El\TTIRE RECORDS OF THE DEFENDANT 
COMPANY, TOGETHER WITH THE CORROBORATING 
TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESSES, ESTABLISHED THAT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE DECEASED INSURED 
HAD ELECTED ONE OF THE OPTIONS UNDER THE 
POLICY. 
At the time of the offering of the various company records, 
the plaintiffs' counsel stated: 
"Mr. Bushnell: Let's stop there because I object: If 
Your Honor please, in connection with exhibits 2 
through 9 for the purpose of this motion, the plaintiff 
is willing to still say that if witnesses were called from 
the office of the defendant, they would testify that 
these are the business documents, business entries in 
the usual course of their business and for this motion 
we have not inisted upon any foundation and if he 
therefore makes his motion as to these numbered ex-
hibits, they were not offered at the time of the pre-
trial when they easily could have been offered, and we 
object to their introduction at this time." 
R. 17 
The exhibits in question, 2, 3, 4, and 9, were admitted 
by the court, and therefore plaintiffs' admissions as to the fact 
that they were prepared in the usual course of business pre-
cludes any challenge by the jury as to their authenticity or 
to their content. 
These exhibits show that certain entries were made, and 
as they were made in the normal course of business, the un-
disputed presumption is that the entries were made at the 
16 
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time of the event, in this case, the election of the option by 
the insured. 
This undisputed documentary evidence may not be ignored 
by the jury, nor can the jury be permitted to speculate upon 
its content. As a matter of law, inasmuch as the entries were 
not challenged, but on the contrary were admitted to have 
been made in the course of business, these documents stand 
as establishing the facts stated thereon. 
CONCLUSION 
We submit that the court erred in not taking into con-
sideration that unless an election had been made previously, 
when the insured, Alma M. Page, received a check (Defend-
ant's Exhibit 9) for a $4.75 dividend, he would not have cashed 
the check, but on the contrary would have inquired why a 
$4.75 dividend only, when the previous dividend for the first 
half of 1955 had been $56.00, and for the full year of 1954 
was $85.98. (See Defendant's Exhibit 4). 
The court makes a point regarding the eyelets in the 
insurance policy, Exhibit 1: However, the court failed to take 
into consideration the fact that the photostatic copies of the 
application, Part I and Part II, which had been attached to 
the insurance policy by an eyelet located in the center of the 
policy, were forcibly removed by someone, as the mute evidence 
will indicate. 
We submit, that although the record is silent as to who 
detached the photostats, the evidence is conclusive that the 
insured or the beneficiary, Meredith Page, had the policy 
17 
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in his possession after the 15th day of August, 1955, until the 
same was presented as an exhibit in this matter. 
We submit, further, that nowhere in the record did the 
plaintiffs attempt to show that the widow, Ruth Jensen Page, 
had any feelings, bias, prejudice or interest in this matter 
whatsoever. The first attempt to raise this issue was during 
the arguments before the Supreme Court, when Counsel for 
plaintiffs admitted that the question had not been raised at 
the time of the trial. 
The court itself has now resorted to conjecture and specu-
lation which is completely without the evidence, testimony 
and case, in an attempt to show that the widow might have 
been interested or have had a bias or prejudice to the outcome 
of the trial. It is to be noted that this woman was a recent 
convert to the LDS Church, and it is extremely unlikely that 
one so recently converted to religion would violate the oath 
which she took to God. 
We respectfully submit that the petition for rehearing 
should be granted, and the court should reconsider its decision 
in the true light of all of the evidence in order that justice 
may prevail and there will no longer be an inference that the 
officers of the defendant company deliberately perjured them-
selves, altered their records, created false evidence, and con-
nived to defeat an obligation, as is now drawn from the court's 
decision. 
Respectfully submitted, 
COTRO-MANES & COTRO-MANES 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
18 
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